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Posthumous ‘Punishment’: 
What May be Done about Criminal Wrongs after the Wrongdoer’s Death? 
 
Abstract: The commission of criminal wrongs is occasionally revealed after the (suspected) 
wrongdoer’s death. In such cases, there seems to be a widely-shared intuition, which also 
frequently motivates many people’s actions, that the dead should still be blamed and that 
some response, not only stemming from civil society but also the state, to the criminal wrong 
is necessary. This article explores the possibility of posthumous blame and punishment by the 
state. After highlighting the deficiencies of the pure versions of retributivism and general 
deterrence theory, but also the potential in the latter, it argues for a political theory of the 
criminal law (mainly from a normative perspective, although the modest claim is made in 
passing that current institutional arrangements are best understood in this light), which views 
institutions of punishment as the business not only of defendants and victims but also the 
political community as a whole. Within this normative scheme posthumous responses to 
wrongs are possible and in some cases necessary for the maintenance of the stability of the 
political community. Accountability-holding processes may also be possible and necessary 
for the protection of the reputation of the deceased suspected wrongdoer. 
 
1. Introduction 
In October 2012 a UK television news broadcast
1
 revealed a number of allegations of sexual 
offences committed by Sir Jimmy Savile, a radio DJ and TV presenter regarded by many as a 
“national treasure” Jimmy Savile had already been dead for a year before the programme was 
aired. The police eventually investigated these allegations in what was dubbed “Operation 
Yewtree”2 In the course of the investigation an ever-increasing number of people recounted 
having been sexually abused by Savile in their childhoods; it also emerged that Savile may 
have been involved in other types of criminal wrongdoing. By January 2013, the 
Metropolitan Police Service—the police force leading the operation—estimated that Savile 
was involved in approximately 450 cases.
3
 A report was published under the title, “Giving 
Victims a Voice”.4 Empowering victims was indeed the explicit purpose of the investigation 
and the report. 
 
1 http://www.itv.com/news/update/2012-10-04/watch-the-itv-documentary-on-jimmy-savile/ (last 
accessed on 15 May 2015). 
2 The investigation also spanned over alleged historical crimes of the same nature committed by others. 
Some have been convicted on various grounds and others released. The investigation as well as some 
criminal trials are still ongoing. 
3 According to research carried out by the NSPCC (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children) broadcast on the BBC in June 2014, the number of cases reaches 500. In November 2014 yet 
more allegations emerged and are being investigated by hospitals, with which Savile was linked. 
4 http://content.met.police.uk/News/Giving-Victims-a-Voice/1400014181251/1257246745756. 
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In the meantime everyone associated with Savile (he was the patron and founder of a 
number of charities, many of which were related to children) began to dissociate themselves 
from him. Statues were removed, footpaths and conference halls were renamed, charities 
closed down. There was even a suggestion by the Prime Minister of stripping Savile of the 
knighthood bestowed on him in 1990 for charitable services.
 5
 
These practices are essentially punitive at the very least in the sense that they constitute 
an active disapprobation of the acts of the dead wrongdoer. Many may simply have wanted to 
wash their hands of Savile but the ways in which they went about it, mostly by removing his 
name from the historical record and destroying his reputation, also amounts to inflicting a 
sort of punishment on him by.
6
 This, in turn, presupposes that it is possible to hold the 
wrongdoer accountable for the wrongdoing. 
One might object that it is inaccurate and inappropriate to speak of punishment with 
reference to actions on the part of civil society and that it is only punitive action emanating 
from the state that should be subject to the kind of scrutiny that I propose to develop in this 
article. The response to this preliminary objection is that the state either is or ought to always 
be involved in and concerned with such practices in one way or another. To name but a few 
reasons, first, the state is under a duty to recognise victims of wrongdoing as precisely that. 
Second, it is also under a duty to protect the reputation of alleged wrongdoers. Third, there 
may be circumstances in which investigating the guilt of the dead and passing judgment on 
their culpability is inescapable. Say, for example,—and this did happen in the case of Jimmy 
Savile—that one is held responsible as a participant in a crime of which the principal 
perpetrator is already dead. For a court to be able to hold the accomplice accountable, it 
cannot but examine the potentially culpable acts of the deceased principal offender. 
Importantly, these practices reveal an intuition, which seems to be quite widespread: 
namely, that criminal wrongs do not disappear with the wrongdoer’s death nor is the need to 
condemn the wrongdoer eliminated. State institutions must therefore be able somehow to 
address these wrongs. This article is placed against the background of treating the deceased 
as the type of subject capable of receiving blame and the sense that a response to wrongs is 
 
5 Savile had also been made a Knight Commander of the Pontifical Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great 
by the Holy See. 
6 There is a wealth of historical examples of such practices, many of which are, however, coupled with a strong 
shared belief in an afterlife. 
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required even after the death of the wrongdoer.
7
 The main purpose is to begin to explore 
whether any philosophical support is available for such practices and intuitions. 
I will explore from a theoretical perspective two questions, which have hardly been 
addressed in the literature at all. First, may the dead be punished or, to phrase it a little more 
broadly, may the state respond to wrongdoing in a way that can be understood as 
distinctively punitive after the death of the wrongdoer? Second, may the dead be held 
accountable for crimes they are alleged to have committed during their lifetimes? In the 
course of answering these questions I also hope to raise some issues relating to the pure 
variants of some general theories of punishment. 
Three preliminary notes are necessary. My argument is largely based on the assumption 
that death marks the complete obliteration of the physical person and his/her consciousness. 
This is simply an assumption based on the current state of our knowledge, which I take to be 
acceptable to all. It does not amount to taking a view on the possibility of an afterlife. It 
therefore does not prejudice the conclusions regarding the political institution of responding 
to criminal wrongs, which I hope will be acceptable independently of one’s beliefs about our 
state after death. 
Secondly, the reason I speak of “punishment” is because I do not have in mind 
punishment in its common sense understanding of bringing about some reduction in welfare 
but rather as some response, which still counts as specifically punitive and therefore distinct 
to other kinds of responses, to wrongdoing and as a response to wrongdoing. 
Thirdly, the section on whether it may be permissible to hold a deceased wrongdoer 
accountable in court is underdeveloped in relation to the section on whether there may be a 
conception of punishment which may apply to such wrongdoers. The main reason for this is 
lack of space. I do, however, think it is important at least to raise the issue and highlight the 
main questions and principles at play. 
 
2. May the Dead be “Punished”? 
Let me start with the question of punishment specifically. Consider a defendant (D), who was 
put on trial, found guilty of having committed an offence and sentenced appropriately. 
However, before beginning to serve his sentence, D dies. Are there still grounds for imposing 
 
7 This is independent of the question of whether the passage of time affects judgements as to whether a crime 
ought to be prosecuted and the wrongdoer punished for it. 
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some kind of penalty? The answer to this revolves around one’s approach to the point and 
content of punishment. 
 
A. The Deserving Dead 
Some believe that punishment is deserved by wrongdoers, precisely because they have 
committed a wrong. They also generally believe that wrongdoers deserve something specific, 
that is to be made to suffer for their wrong. 
Desert here is an action-guiding concept. To say that D deserves x because of his/her 
action φ is not only to make a judgement regarding the value of φ but also to say that D ought 
to be given x. This is so in cases of praise or rewards. To say that D deserves a pay rise 
means that, if P is in a position of giving the pay rise, then P has a putative reason to do so. 
Should P fail to give D the pay rise, then D is entitled to demand it. This much should be 
obvious. Things are not different though when what is deserved is not praise or reward but 
blame and suffering. If D has done wrong and therefore deserves punishment, then, if P is in 
a position to impose punishment, P has putative reason to punish D. 
I say the reason is putative because some desert theorists believe that there may be 
other reasons trumping the desert-based reasons to punish. It is not entirely clear what these 
reasons may be but, at the very least, they must be of the same kind; they must be reasons 
pertaining to the deserving person qua person, which is what grounds desert in the first 
place. In the case of rewards, perhaps the deserving party turning down the reward is a 
good enough reason not to insist in giving the reward. In the case of punishment, perhaps 
something like mercy would outweigh desert. There may be good reasons not to punish 
someone who is, say, terminally ill. However, consequentialist or pragmatic considerations 
are not of the same kind and do not have the same force. If D deserves to be punished, it is 
not a good enough reason not to punish him that prisons are overcrowded or that he has 
escaped and is difficult to recapture. For retributivists, all wrongs ought to be punished.8 
It follows that, if a wrong is not punished and stays with the community, something is 
amiss and those who have the reason to punish have failed to act on the right reasons. 
The death of one who has been proven responsible for a wrong and therefore deserves 
punishment is not a good enough reason to trump the desert reason to punish him. For it to be 
so, it must be the case that the deserving party’s demise results in either the wrong committed 
 
8 For a very strong expression of this, see Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press 1997), p. 154.  
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and/or the desert relation (i.e., that the wrongdoer deserves to be punished) being cancelled 
out. I do not see how either can be true. 
First, the wrongdoer’s death cannot undo the wrong because the wrong is not an 
attribute of the wrongdoer for it to be obliterated along with the latter. 
Second, desert would be cancelled out altogether with the wrongdoer’s death if the 
personhood of the dead were completely obliterated. But this is not so. Some of our 
personhood survives our physical existence. Our reputation, the ways in which we have 
interacted with others and the relations that we have forged, the things we have created, exist 
after our physical demise and still bear our mark. All these things that we leave behind can be 
interfered with and this is an interference with the extension of our person. This is what 
makes it meaningful—and I do not think that a retributivist would be able to contest this—to 
still speak of the dead as persons and to say that they deserve praise, reward or blame. 
Interference with our extensions after our death also amounts to us—note: in that specific 
sense of what “we” are after our death—being treated kindly or harshly, even though we are 
unaware of it.
 9
 
What death may have an effect on, however, is the very possibility of punishing the 
dead. Whether this is the case depends on how one understands punishment. 
The type of desert theory that I have in mind here takes a strong stance not only on 
the reasons for punishing but also on punishment itself. If we “count noises”, to quote 
Mitchell Berman
10
, most retributivists consider suffering to be the proper desert object and 
not simply hard treatment. Now, perhaps one can be subject to hard treatment or even harm 
while unaware of it (and this includes the dead). Hard treatment alone, however, or anything 
else that is not experienced by D does not satisfy the requirement set by desert theory. 
Perhaps the surviving part of the personhood of the dead can be subject to hard treatment but 
the dead cannot suffer. 
Nor is it available to retributivists to argue that the death of the wrongdoer counts as 
sufficient punishment. First of all, death itself, i.e., the state of not existing any longer, may 
be harmful, because it necessarily means that the dead miss out on the opportunity to enjoy 
 
9 For a thorough argument about the possibility of posthumous harm, see Joel Feinberg, The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others (Oxford University Press 1987), pp. 79ff. See 
also Dorothy Grover, ‘Posthumous Harm’ (1989) 39 The Philosophical Quarterly 156, pp. 334-353 
10 Mitchell Berman, ‘Two Kinds of Retributivism’ in R.A. Duff and Stuart P. Green (Eds.) The Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law, OUP 2011. Berman also provides a very helpful survey of retributivist views on 
this. 
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things that they have and could have enjoyed or continued to enjoy.
11
 But death itself, i.e., the 
state of being dead, is not a form of suffering.
12
 Now, imagine an alternative scenario in 
which D falls ill and suffers in his illness before being punished. It is not uncommon for 
people to think that in such cases the convicted “got what he deserved”. This may be partly 
true in that it may be the case that the suffering caused by the illness is more or less the same 
as the suffering that would have been inflicted by the state. What makes a crucial difference 
though is that the harm is not inflicted by the state
13
 and, more importantly, it is not inflicted 
in response to the wrong committed. Since the desert source, i.e., the state, is implied in the 
retributivist version of the desert relation, if there is no connection between the suffering and 
the desert base, then the retributive aim of punishing is not achieved. 
A retributivist may, however, counterargue that there is nothing in the desert claim, 
i.e., the claim that the wrongdoing is sufficient reason for punishing the wrongdoer, to 
determine the desert object, i.e., what is deserved by the wrongdoer, as suffering 
specifically.
14
 The desert object could, therefore, be something that might apply equally well 
to deceased wrongdoers. To counter this, a direct connection must be established between 
desert and the requirement that the wrongdoer experience his punishment. I believe that such 
a connection can be made. 
The desert subject in the retributivist version of the desert claim is the conscious 
person with the capacity to reason.
15
 To deserve something implies a degree of reciprocity 
(which is explicit in the very term “retribution”). One deserves something by virtue of a 
basis, generally something one has said or done. As I argued above, it does not follow from 
the deserving party’s demise that the desert relation expires. However, a necessary condition 
of reciprocity, which is that the deserving party has the same basic constitutive features as 
when the desert basis was established, has been eliminated with the desert subject’s death. To 
the extent that retributivists insist that desert is the only reason for punishing, then they must 
 
11 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press 2012). 
12 Epicurus thought this. See his Letter to Menoeceus. 
13 For an argument as to why punishment as an “inherent public good” may only be administered by 
public bodies, see Alon Harel and Ahivay Dorfman, ‘The Case Against Privatization’ (2013) 41 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, pp. 67-102. 
14 It would not, however, be open to retributivists to argue that the desert claim does not determine the desert 
object at all. Surrendering the desert object to other reasons, for instance, consequentialist ones, would amount 
to reducing punishment to external reasons. For an account of how the retributivist idea has been merged with 
consequentialism in that way, see Berman above n. 10. 
15 This is not to say that this is the desert subject in all desert claims. That is a separate question. 
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accept that the desert relation remains incomplete. It is also revealed that, when we do blame 
or praise the dead, we do so for reasons other than their “deserving” to be blamed or praised. 
I explore some such reasons in Section C. 
So this is where this leaves pure retributivism: D is judged as deserving punishment, 
from which it follows that the state is under a duty to punish D by making him suffer. D, 
however, escapes punishment because he dies, which makes it impossible for him to suffer. 
For some retributivists, especially those in the Kantian tradition, this allows for a wrongful 
state of affairs to be perpetuated. But it becomes clear that even the less metaphysically 
charged versions of retributivism fail to provide those to whom they ascribe the duty to 
punish with the resources to do so in a potentially significant class of cases of wrongdoing. 
A necessary consequence of this is that desert theory is also unable to provide any 
satisfaction to the victims of a dead wrongdoer as well to as the rest of the community. This, 
of course, is not pure retributivism’s main aim. Such good consequences are a “happy 
surplus”, to quote Michael Moore.16 Nevertheless, it must be somehow part of retributivism’s 
aims as a complete theory of punishment just as it must be somehow an aim of every theory 
of punishment, because we necessarily make sense of wrongdoing and punishment at least 
partly in terms of their impact on the community, which has been wronged. 
 
B. The Fearful Living 
Another way of looking at retributivism’s failure is in terms of its excessive focus on the 
individual wrongdoer and on the experiential, though non-consequentialist, aspect of 
punishment. The (typically thought of as an) alternative to deontological, pure retributivism 
is a consequentialist conception of punishment.  
I assume that the most plausible consequentialist justification of punishment, as well 
as the most relevant to the question of what to do about criminal wrongs after the 
wrongdoer’s death, is a deterrence-oriented one. Of course, not individual deterrence in this 
case but general. In this view, punishment is justified in terms of its good impact on the 
community through providing disincentives to would-be offenders. Many objections to this 
view can be and have been raised. I will suggest that, under some conditions some of which I 
will set out in the following section, general deterrence can provide an appropriate 
conceptual and practical framework to posthumous blame and punishment. However, some 
 
16 Moore, Placing Blame (n. 7), p. 153. 
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of the familiar objections do eventually resurface. I will address these objections by placing 
consequentialism about punishment in a different framework in the following section. 
The argument from deterrence boils down to the claim that the threat and prospect of 
punishment provides agents with a prudential, self-regarding reason, which, at least in most 
cases, is assumed to be sufficiently strong to outweigh most of the motivations held by 
rational agents to commit wrongs.  
This claim rests on at least the following foundational presuppositions: i) everyone 
can and does engage in instrumental reasoning; ii) prudential, self-regarding reasons can 
outweigh any other reasons or what may seem as different kinds of reasons can be reduced to 
prudential reasons; iii) prudential, self-regarding reasons have some weight for everyone; iv) 
the prospect of punishment is a prudential, self-regarding reason to which everyone can 
respond in a way that will guide his or her actions away from the wrong. This in turn 
presupposes that v) it is rational to want to avoid being punished after death.  
There is much that is controversial about assumptions i-iii but I will not go into these 
controversies now. I will focus on whether general deterrence theory (GDT) can consistently 
and plausibly hold iv and v in their combination. 
Is it rational to want to avoid punishment after death? The conception of rationality 
on which GDT seems to rely is belief-based, because its main aim is to manipulate the 
motivations of people rather than to structure the reasons they have independently. So, for 
GDT, if one has good reason to believe or in fact believes that punishment after death can 
negatively affect one’s well-being, then it is rational to try to avoid that punishment. 
One possibility is that GDT must rely on justified belief. In this case, it would be 
justified to threaten people with punishment to the extent that people have good reasons to 
believe that punishment is a bad thing that will happen to them posthumously. 
This partly involves the belief that the likelihood of the state punishing people after 
their death is sufficiently high, as unconsummated threats of punishment do not have the 
same motivating force as ones that one can predict will be consummated. Let us suppose that 
this is the case. The more important question is whether we are justified in believing that 
punishment after death is something bad that we should prudentially try to avoid by acting 
accordingly during our lifetimes. Since justified belief is an objective matter, the grounds for 
such a belief must be worked out philosophically from the standpoint of the GD theorist. 
If one does not believe in an afterlife that somehow mirrors our existence on Earth, 
then it is seems reasonable to not care about what happens after one’s death, especially if one 
is motivated fully and solely by self-regarding reasons. For this to be rational, it must be the 
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case that our deaths mark our complete annihilation as persons, which, as I argued earlier, is 
not the case.  
The question then is not whether we are still somehow present after our deaths but 
whether this sense of being present is one on which GDT can rely in order to justify 
posthumous punishment. It seems to me that the key is again whether the hard treatment must 
be experienced by the punished. I think that this plain version of GDT would require that it 
does. Although our personhood outlives us, our conscious selfhood does not. For the 
purposes of the GDT claim, the addressees of the threat of punishment must believe that 
punishment will have an impact on their ability to act on their preferences, which is clearly 
absurd after their deaths. 
As I stated early on, I have been assuming that death is the end. But, of course, very 
many people believe that it is not and this should be considered when trying to justify 
punishment in terms of belief not least because people believing in an afterlife raise the claim 
that there is good reason to do so. This does not seem like the kind of claim on which GDT 
can rely. Whether there is such a thing as an afterlife (a question largely linked to the 
question of god’s existence) is fraught with controversy. If GDT took it upon itself to 
adjudicate between all the reasonable beliefs about whether there is an afterlife and what it 
may be like, it would remain inconclusive and debilitated. 
But perhaps GDT does not need to adjudicate between beliefs in that way. Perhaps all 
that it needs to do is to track beliefs firmly held by a sufficiently large section of the 
population at large, which it can then systematise as social psychological data and judge 
accordingly whether the threat of posthumous punishment has any weight in people’s 
motivational structures. In that case, it is a question of numbers. If a sufficient number of 
people believe for whatever reason that being punished on Earth after death will be a bad 
thing that will happen to them, then GDT has everything it needs to threaten with 
posthumous punishment, because it is rational for people to be motivated by and act on that 
threat. 
I do not see anything incoherent about this but, at the same time, it seems 
unworkable. First of all, it requires a wide overlap of beliefs, which is hardly attainable in 
contemporary societies. Second, it is exceedingly taxing because it requires constantly 
tracking people’s beliefs, relating them to each other, systematising them and so forth in 
order to draw up any punitive policy. For a theory of punishment that capitalises on 
efficiency to the extent that GDT does, this is a serious problem. 
10 
 
It appears so far that the versions of GDT explored so far share one shortcoming with 
pure retributivism in relation to responding to wrongs after the wrongdoer’s death, namely 
their experiential orientation. Retributivism, on the one hand, cannot justify punishment that 
is not experienced by the wrongdoer. GDT, on the other hand, cannot establish deterrence 
because the threat of punishment as an evil does not have any purchase, if the addressees of 
the threat cannot build the threat into their motivational structures because they will not be 
around to experience those evils. 
However, there are still ways in which GDT is able to provide a viable justification 
for posthumous punishment, while still relying on justified belief and without abandoning its 
consequentialist and self-regarding orientation.  
One might argue that, even though it may be irrational to worry about things that 
happen directly to us after our death, it is rational to worry about things that happen to others 
as a result of our punishment not as an expression of altruism but because of the impact that 
these consequences on others will have on us.
17
 Such bad things can and do happen to others. 
Posthumous punishment will almost certainly affect, for instance, the reputations and 
financial positions of surviving family members just as punishment during one’s lifetime 
does. The question then is whether it is rational for D to worry about the impact that D being 
posthumously punished will have on others. 
There are at least two ways of thinking about this. First, no matter how egoistic GDT 
holds us to be, it is still the case that even the most hardened individualists will care for and 
have an interest in the well-being of at least some other people, with whom they are closely 
linked (children, lovers etc.). If the consequences of D’s criminal wrongdoing have an 
adverse effect on the lives of those to whom D is closely linked, this is something of concern 
to D. But, of course, as I have already argued, since D will not be there to experience this 
negative impact, then it can make no difference to D’s motivational disposition. 
Nevertheless, being aware of the eventuality of bringing unhappiness upon D’s loved ones 
may make a difference to D’s motivation during D’s lifetime. In other words, worrying now 
about the consequences that D’s actions will have for D’s loved ones in the future may go 
some way towards deterring D from offending. 
 
17 One might argue that we care about others selflessly and without considering the impact on our well-
being. I am not considering this argument here mainly because it does not square with the prudential, 
self-regarding orientation of a GDT. Unfortunately, lack of space does not allow me to consider it as an 
independent argument and its implications for the justification of punishment. 
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If this seems a little far-fetched (not least because the eventuality of the adverse 
impact on others’ lives seems too remote for it to make much of a difference to most people’s 
motivational disposition), a second way of thinking about the same idea is arguably a little 
stronger. Even if we concede that we are completely self-regarding and egoistic (not a view 
that I share but accept for the sake of the argument here), we will still have to accept that our 
lives and well-being inescapably depend on the well-being of others in at least two very weak 
senses. First, for us to carry out the majority of our activities, it must be the case that others 
are in a position to contribute to the completion of our plans (while pursuing their own plans, 
not out of altruism). Second, and more importantly for my purposes here, many of the 
activities that we pursue, from making chairs to conducting research on long-term 
macroeconomics, are worth pursuing because their results will be enjoyed by others even 
after our deaths.
18
 It would follow from this that, if we know with relative certainty that our 
wrongful actions will adversely affect other people’s ability to enjoy the product of our 
current activities after our death, we will be motivated not to commit wrongs because this 
will result in our activities losing much of their value for us now and therefore our well-being 
will be negatively affected during our lifetimes. Note that this argument is still experiential 
not in the sense that we will be there to experience the consequences of posthumous 
punishment but in that the prospect of the negative consequences of the posthumous 
punishment will negatively affect our life plans. It is still obviously consequentialist. It is also 
arguably self-regarding, because it concerns the effects on us and it does not presuppose an 
exclusively other-regarding concern for others.
19
 Note also that punishment is an independent 
reason for not offending rather than enforcing a reason which one would have had 
independently, because it introduces a fact (the reduction in the well-being of those to whom 
our activities are linked), which would have been unavailable without the punitive 
intervention of the state. 
Once again, there is nothing conceptually incoherent with this argument. However, 
there may be two independent reasons for which it needs to be qualified. First, for it to work, 
punishment of the wrongdoer and the consequences for the personal network of the 
wrongdoer’s must collapse into each other. In other words, the impact on the people linked to 
 
18  For this argument see Samuel Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife (Niko Kolodny, Ed.) (Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
19 Scheffler (ibid) believes that the fact that we will feel that our activities now will be devoid of value 
if humanity does not survive us for a sustainable period of time shows that we are not entirely egoistic 
beings. I do not need to go into that argument in this context. 
12 
 
the wrongdoer would have to be significantly serious, indeed punitive, for its threat to have 
any purchase in deterring the possible wrongdoer. Perhaps a GD theorist would not be 
squeamish about effectively punishing the innocent but, nevertheless, this possibility should 
make us pause and think twice about how attractive such a proposition is. There may be also 
a related reason from within GDT making the argument less attractive. Namely, it is 
questionable whether people would be motivated to simply acquiesce to such 
disproportionate (and intuitively unfair) laws thus undermining such laws’ very 
effectiveness. 
An alternative is to formulate a GDT-oriented justification of posthumous punishment 
in terms of how one’s well-being now will be affected by events at the point of one’s death 
and after it.  
The most relevant and plausible way of thinking about this is in terms of informed 
desire satisfaction.
20
 Some believe that our well-being does not necessarily depend on our 
experiencing pleasure but on the extent to which our desires are fulfilled. In other words, one 
may not only be harmed without knowing it or ever finding out about it; one may also lead a 
fulfilled life without knowing it. Suppose that I have the informed desire that my students, 
whom I know well and to whom I have talked on many occasions about their futures, 
succeed professionally. If these students never get in touch with me again after graduation, 
my desire will still have been fulfilled if they do succeed professionally even without me 
experiencing any such satisfaction. The same idea could be extended to events that take place 
after one’s death. If I have the informed desire that my daughter become a Member of 
Parliament, I die and then she is indeed elected, my desire will have been fulfilled.  
The possible ramification of this for posthumous punishment is not that my 
punishment will affect my well-being after my death
21
 but that being punished after my death 
will affect my well-being now, because I know that punishment after death will frustrate the 
desires and plans that I form during my lifetime. This, the argument would go, should be 
sufficient rationally to motivate me to not commit criminal wrongs during my lifetime. 
 
20 Peter Railton, ‘Facts and Values’ (1986) 14 Philosophical Topics 2, pp. 5-31. 
21 Aristotle considers this in the Nicomachean Ethics. He tries to reconcile the, at the time, widely-
shared intuition that events in other people’s lives have a bearing on the happiness of the dead and his 
intuition that the opposite view would be too unsociable (in his own understanding of sociability) with 
his view of happiness as the active life. For an exegetic comment on this, see Kurt Pritzl, ‘Aristotle and 
Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11’ (1983) 78 Classical Philology 2, pp. 101-111. 
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Before considering this argument in more detail, let me highlight one general problem 
about the informed desire satisfaction conception of well-being, a problem which will 
resurface a little later. In James Griffin’s words: “… one’s desires spread themselves so 
widely over the world that their objects extend far outside the bound of what, with any 
plausibility, one could take as touching one’s own well-being”.22 There are two further and 
interlinked (and relevant to the issue in question here) extensions to the same argument about 
removing the experiential requirement. First, the range of things that may affect our well-
being is vast. Second, our well-being may then depend too extensively on events, choices, 
successes and failures, which we cannot control.  
I can see three ways in which the threat of posthumous punishment may frustrate D’s 
lifetime desires in a way that may have an impact on D’s motivations: i) the punishment may 
threaten to frustrate the desire that D wanted to satisfy by committing the crime; ii) the 
punishment may threaten to frustrate a wider range of D’s desires, which may be 
unconnected to the crime; iii) the punishment may threaten to frustrate a general meta-desire, 
which underlies a sufficient number of D’s specific lifetime desires and which is assumed to 
be shared by a sufficient number of people. 
Option (i) may have some purchase in the context of crimes, which are committed in 
order to satisfy long-term desires. Suppose that D embezzled a large amount of money to 
guarantee the future of his children. The problem here is that very few of the crimes that we 
would want to prevent by threatening with punishment after death are of this sort. The 
desires, if any, that, say, sexual offences or offences against the person satisfy are generally 
satisfied immediately through the commission of the offence itself. Therefore the scope of 
the threat of punishment would be rather narrow and fail to prevent the commission of a 
sufficient number of offences.  
Option (ii) avoids this error by dissociating the threat of punishment from the crime-
specific desire. If, say, D commits a sexual offence, the threat could be directed to other 
desires of D’s such as his desire that his children are well off with the wealth that he has 
accrued. This poses some problems. It seems very difficult to single out in an agent-
independent way the long-term desires, which a would-be offender would not want to 
frustrate. In other words, it is very difficult to draw any generalisations regarding desires that 
a sufficient number of people will share. One way around this would be for the relevant rule 
 
22 James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1986), 17. 
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to be so general as to be applicable to everyone’s circumstances without specifying in 
advance which desires the punishment would frustrate (something like “benefits that D is 
proven to have valued the most during D’s lifetime or their equivalent will be removed from 
D’s estate”). This could work better assuming that it is feasible (which it may be but it will 
certainly be exceedingly difficult) to work out how various desires are structured for each 
individual offender. In any case, legal rules that remain indeterminate to such an extent 
would also pose serious rule of law problems. It could also easily have the opposite effect, 
because, if one does not know which desires eventual punishment will disappoint, one will 
either not have a strong enough incentive to comply or one may even have a perverse 
incentive to not comply repeatedly. Moreover, most surviving desires will be other-related, 
which raises the problem of unfair impact on third parties, which I identified earlier when 
considering whether the justifiability of threatening harming others connected to the 
wrongdoer as punishment for the latter (imagine, for example, that my daughter is removed 
from her seat in Parliament because of my wrongdoing). 
Option (iii) is similar to option (ii) in that the threat is relatively general and left to be 
specified in light of each wrongdoer’s circumstances. The main difference is that this kind of 
desire is assumed to enjoy priority over other desires that we may form. It can also be 
specified to a greater degree than the general desires I discussed above. The most obvious 
meta-desire that I can think of is good reputation, which also includes good posthumous 
reputation (what the Greeks called hysterophemia). It is plausible to think that it is a desire 
that we all share to one degree or another. It is also prior to other desires in that, if it goes 
unsatisfied, satisfying other desires loses much or all of their value (most people would not 
want to be wealthy but disgraced) and in that not satisfying it may in fact jeopardise the 
satisfaction of other desires (this applies to one’s reputation while alive but also to 
hysterophemia; many of our long-term desires largely depend on the maintenance of our 
good reputation). 
It is plausible that threatening the satisfaction of hysterophemia (or any other meta-
desire) will have a deterrent effect. There are, however, some independent problems, which 
go back to the general problems about GDT, which make it a rather unattractive option, if left 
unconstrained. It seems disproportionate to most crimes. One might think that reputational 
damage is inescapable when one is tangled up as a defendant in the criminal justice system. 
This, however, is a side effect, which in fact the criminal justice system itself is under a duty 
to mitigate so as to ensure that the punishment does not exceed the offence (whatever the 
measure of proportionality may be). At the same time, targeting one’s hysterophemia directly 
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and widely will also adversely impact third parties and especially those whose well-being 
depends on the satisfaction of D’s meta-desire. 
 
C. The Dead and the Living in Community 
Recall that the failure of making sense of posthumous punishment in terms of deserved 
suffering indicates that we are in need of a justification that looks further than the wrongdoer 
as the immediate target of punishment while not losing sight of the fact that punishment is a 
response to a wrong. Although general deterrence offers this and can play some role in 
grounding posthumous punishment, it cannot serve as the sole or as a freestanding 
justification because of the limitations flowing mainly from its tendency to punish third 
parties and its tendency to punish in ways that exceed any intuition regarding the gravity of 
criminal wrongs. 
What is therefore required is a way of thinking about posthumous punishment in a 
relational, non-experiential way, which may also be able to accommodate constrained 
consequentialist considerations. One such way is in the terms of a political justification of 
punishment. To explain this, I will begin by outlining, admittedly cursorily, what I have in 
mind.
23
 
The fact that we are members of an organised governed political community 
generates specific, political normative relations between us, which are public/political in 
nature. Publicity has two senses. First, it refers to the capacity in which we relate to each 
other, that is as members of the political community and in our extensions in the world and 
not as moral agents. The public character of these relations may determine their form but 
does not and cannot determine their content.
24
 This can only happen against the background 
of facts as they develop in each specific political community making our external relations 
 
23 The political turn in criminal law theory has been gaining momentum over the last few years. Some notable 
contributions are R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 
Publishing 2007); John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice 
(Oxford University Press 1990); Matt Matravers, Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of Coercion (Oxford 
University Press 2000); Dan Markel ‘Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship’ (2012) 1 
Virginia Journal of Criminal Law 1, pp. 1-134; I began to develop such a similar, yet different in significant 
respects, approach in Emmanuel Melissaris, ‘Toward a Political Theory of Criminal Law: A Critical Rawlsian 
Account’ (2012) 15 New Criminal Law Review 1, pp. 122-155. I am currently developing it further in a book-
length treatment. The account here builds on that work. 
24 This is largely contra a political philosophy such as Kant’s, which only admits the first sense of 
publicity. 
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public/political in the second sense. In this step, the question ceases to be formal and 
philosophical; it is situated in real contexts and becomes an inquiry into the basic and 
irreducible facts that animate our institutional structure. 
There is some disagreement in modern political philosophy as to what the basis upon 
which the state and law may be constructed. One point of convergence—certainly one shared 
by theories placing themselves in the post-metaphysical, constructivist tradition—is that late 
modern constitutional democratic states are based on a political conception of the person as 
free and equal in the sense that there can be no a priori valuable conception of the good or, in 
a different formulation, valuable mode of exercise of private autonomy.
 25
 
This political conception of the person and the political community has various 
upshots for institutions of criminalisation and punishment. First, the justification and content 
of such institutions are always public in the sense that it relates to individuals in their 
capacity as members of the political community (they are political in the first sense identified 
earlier). Second, the justification of criminalisation and punishment become part of the 
institutional structure and can only be justified and shaped in relation to it and not in a 
freestanding manner (they are political in the second of the above senses). An extension of 
this is that criminalisation and punishment are contingent institutions; there is nothing 
necessitating the category of crime or the practice of punishment. Third, and this specifies the 
previous point for our political communities, whichever content criminalisation and 
punishment are given, they must always be respectful of the political conception of the 
person as free and equal. Fourth, it follows that crimes can only be public wrongs, i.e., 
violations of political duties specified by the institutional structure. A further implication of 
publicity is that the wrongs are of concern to the whole political community and not only to 
those at the receiving end of the wrong, because it is a disruption of the institutional structure 
which has an impact on everyone participating in it. From the fact that a wrong is a violation 
of a duty, it follows that there is a reason to respond to this violation with an accountability-
seeking measure. Very importantly, this is already justified to the wrongdoer as it is a term of 
the institutional structure that he or she has already accepted by participating in it. From the 
fact that the violated duty is political follows that it is the political community as a whole and 
as represented by the appropriate institutions that is entitled to respond to the violation. Fifth, 
 
25 I take John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas to have provided the most central expressions of the post-
metaphysical turn. See mainly J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1993) and J. 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 
trans. William Rehg (MIT Press 1996).  
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what the response will be is not a matter of necessity but of appropriateness. Whether it will 
be what we normally consider as punishment or something else depends on which measure 
will best serve the stability of the political community in the face of its disruption through the 
wrong. 
Let us return to our fictional character D who has committed a wrong and died after 
having been found guilty and liable but before serving his sentence. In the political 
understanding of crime and punishment, the reason for responding to D’s wrong does not 
expire with his death. The disruption to the institutional structure and the impact that the 
wrong has had on the political community by reshuffling normative positions in an 
unauthorised manner cannot be extinguished by D’s death. In this political conception, the 
wrong is, of course, attributable to the wrongdoer but also becomes part of the political 
community.  
As I said earlier, the reason for responding to a wrong is already justified to D to the 
extent that he is a member of the political community and the reasons introduced by the 
institutional structure apply to him. One may ask, however, how this can be the case after 
one’s death, given that no reasons may possibly apply to the dead. I think the answer is 
straightforward. What is justified to the person is the eventuality of a response to his or her 
wrongdoing (under certain procedural and substantive conditions, some of which I will 
discuss a little later on). This has already taken place during the wrongdoer’s lifetime and this 
suffices. 
It does not, however, follow from the fact that there is a reason for responding to a 
wrong even after the wrongdoer’s death that a response is necessary or that it necessarily 
ought to take a specific form. This is because a response does not “undo” the wrong by 
restoring the victim’s rights. Whether to respond and how to respond depends on whether a 
specific response is the appropriate one for cancelling as much of the impact of the 
wrongdoing as possible. It follows from the public character of wrongs and institutions of 
punishment that the impact that needs to be cancelled out is the impact on the political 
community. In short, appropriate responses to wrongs are those responses which can 
maintain the stability of the political community. 
What, then, may guarantee stability? Since the content of institutions can only be 
determined with reference to a specific institutional structure as a whole and since my 
argument in this article is mostly formal, I will not make any concrete suggestions as to what 
kind of response may best serve the aim of stability. However, a few things can be said about 
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the general direction that any such institutional responses should take based on the impact 
that institutional responses are meant to reverse. 
Public wrongdoing does not only amount to harming the victim or changing the 
normative relation between the victim and the wrongdoer. It also marks a change in or a 
threat to the normative standing of the victim in the political community. Although I do not 
have the space to develop this idea in detail here, I should highlight that there is no 
metaphysical overtone in it. The wrongdoer’s acts impact upon the victim’s interests in a way 
that deprives the latter of the ability to act on the reasons which would have otherwise been 
available to her. The wrongdoing therefore forces the victim into a different normative role in 
relation both to the wrongdoer as well as the rest of the community
26
. How this may be varies 
from wrong to wrong. For example, the change in the normative position of the victim of a 
property offence and that of a victim of violent crime is different but what matters is that 
there is a change (and I mean prior to and independently of the involvement of the victim in 
the justice system as a victim). The organised response on the part of the state to the 
wrongdoing addresses this in four interconnected ways: i) it recognises the change in 
normative status of the victim by involving him or her as the wronged party in the process of 
responding to the wrong; ii) it reaffirms the proper normative status of the victim by 
responding to the wrongdoing; iii) it reverses to the extent possible or makes amends for the 
actual consequences of the wrongdoing on the victim’s interests; iv) it recognises the change 
in the normative standing of the wrongdoer and the need to reverse that. 
The promise on the part of the state that it will respond to wrongdoing and in fact 
responding also maintains stability by reassuring members of the political community. It 
provides assurance to the actual victims by reversing the effects of the wrong to their 
normative standing. It assures members of the political community at large that, should they 
become victims of crime, the change in their standing in the community will only be 
temporary and that their proper status will be reaffirmed. It also offers them some assurance 
that the actual consequences of their victimisation will be addressed.  
Since this aim of responding to wrongdoing is not directed at the wrongdoer as a 
conscious agent, his or her death makes little difference. It is still appropriate to respond to 
his or her wrongdoing. To illustrate, recall again the Metropolitan Police’s explicit aim of 
empowering victims by giving them a voice. To give victims a voice is already to recognise 
 
26 This argument is similar, yet different in its details, to the Kantian idea that wrongdoing is unilaterally 
authorised by the wrongdoer’s will, which makes it impermissible.  
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them as victims and this presupposes that someone’s wrongdoing has rendered them victims. 
So, despite the care that the Metropolitan Police took to emphasise that this is not a case of 
punishment because the alleged wrongdoer is deceased, to empower the victims presupposes 
a framework, which can justify blaming and punishing the dead wrongdoer. 
A further way of maintaining stability by providing another reason to members of the 
political community to act on institutional reasons is by providing assurance that others will 
have reasons not to commit crimes—in other words, by offering some guarantee of general 
deterrence. This works well and complements the political theory of crime and punishment in 
normal circumstances. When it comes to posthumous punishment, however, some of the 
problems with general deterrence that I identified earlier apply here too. Placing deterrence in 
a political framework does not particularly help with the difficulty in manipulating the 
motivational disposition of the living if the threatened unpleasant consequence of 
wrongdoing will never be experienced or with the difficulty in tracking sufficiently 
generalised beliefs about the afterlife and the impact that punishment on Earth will have on 
the dead.  
Nevertheless, the political conception of punishment can make use of the 
motivational force of posthumous punishment threatening to frustrate D’s plans during his 
lifetime. It can also do so without running the same risks as GDT, i.e., punishing the innocent 
and imposing disproportionate punishment, because the pursuit of the aim of deterrence is 
constrained by the political framework in which it is placed. 
These negative constraints are the following. First, whatever the response to D’s 
wrongdoing may be, it may not have an undue impact on third parties. Say, for example, that 
the most appropriate thing to do is to confiscate part of D’s estate. This measure may not 
interfere with entitlements that D’s heirs would have had independently of D’s death or D’s 
wrongdoing, because this would be unjustifiable (they have committed no wrong) and 
because it would undermine assurance in the political community. This is not to say that the 
response must be necessarily connected to and impact on the wrongdoer’s surviving 
personhood. The most appropriate course of action may be to just “give victims a voice” or 
for the state to somehow compensate them for their losses. But it will more often than not be 
appropriate to impact on the wrongdoer for a reason that has nothing to do with desert. It is 
because it is important that the authorship of the wrong is recognised so that the normative 
standing of the victim as well as the wrongdoer be restored. 
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Second, the response must be proportionate. This is not in the sense that there is some 
metaphysical exchange rate between wrongs and sanctions, as much of retributivist theory 
holds. Recall that in the political conception of punishment proportionality is mediated and 
determined by the need to guarantee stability. Punishment in the strict sense, however, is 
only one among many instruments that can contribute towards that aim. Not only must it be 
kept as last resort because citizens should be given the chance to discharge their political 
duties without being coerced, but it must also operate in conjunction with measures which 
will allow the reaffirmation of the status of everyone as free and equal members of the 
political community (such as restorative justice measures and so forth). This should preclude, 
for example, attempts at completely identifying a wrongdoer as a person with the wrong he 
committed thus overshadowing every other aspect of his life history and destroying his 
reputation altogether. In cases in which tarnishing one’s reputation is the only appropriate 
measure, punishment must be done in a way that is proportionate to the need to provide 
assurance, maintain stability and serves as an effective disincentive. 
 
3. May the Dead be Held Accountable? 
So far, I have been isolating the question of punishment assuming that our wrongdoer D died 
after having been tried and found guilty. This, however, will happen very rarely. Most cases 
will be like Jimmy Savile’s and the wrongdoing will be revealed after the alleged 
wrongdoer’s death. Are there then any grounds for holding the wrongdoer (still ‘D’ but this 
time he dies before being prosecuted) accountable according to the political conception of 
crime and punishment? 
A good place to start thinking about this is to consider what the main aims of 
processes of holding wrongdoers accountable may be. The most basic aims are, first, to 
ascertain facts. Second, it is to apply the relevant law to the circumstances of the particular 
case. Application of the law requires justification of why the specific defendant is held 
accountable and ordered to be punished in a way selected and specified from a legislatively 
predetermined range of measures. It would also seem that these two aims apply to most 
criminal processes and not only the criminal trial. In fact, use of the trial as a mode of 
holding people accountable and imposing punishment is steadily decreasing. Nevertheless, I 
will refer to all accountability-holding processes as “the trial” for the sake of convenience. 
The obvious difference between any regular criminal process and posthumous ones is 
that in the latter the defendant cannot be present. The question then is whether it is necessary 
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that a defendant be present for a trial to be fair and, if so, why. I will approach the question in 
light of the political scheme outlined above and argue, however tentatively, that there may be 
ways of holding the dead accountable and that this resonates with many of our current 
practices. I also focus on D’s presence in person rather than D being properly represented. I 
take the right to representation not to be affected by D’s death. 
If we think of the trial in political terms, we will see that the reason for D’s 
participation is that, although he is facing allegations sufficiently strong for him to be held 
accountable, the state must still treat him as an equal member of the political community. 
This is because D does not stand alone against the rest of the community, which is prepared 
to banish D and exact its vengeance; D is still part of the community, which therefore has a 
duty not only to ascertain guilt and responsibility but also to protect D. But the trial is not 
only a simple two-way interaction of negotiating the exchange of wrong for penalty between 
the state and D. The process is also the business of the political community as a whole in the 
much more extensive and substantive sense that having a proper process ascertaining facts 
and justifying the imposition of some measure is a means of maintaining the community’s 
stability.
27
 The question then is whether this more complex aim of the criminal trial can be 
served in D’s absence. 
It is arguably easier to answer this in relation to the fact-finding aspect of the trial. To 
start with, there are good reasons, reasons already animating the privilege against self-
incrimination recognised by many jurisdictions as well as the ECHR,
28
 for not imposing on D 
a duty to testify. But, of course, defendants also have a right to testify and give their accounts 
of events as they experienced them and as only they can express them.
29
 This right, however, 
is not so strong and the information that D can contribute to the trial not so valuable as to 
provide a good reason not to hold people accountable when they cannot be present in person 
in this process. Although there is symbolic value in allowing D to give his personal testimony 
(a value linked to treating D as free and equal), the primary value of allowing D to have his 
say is instrumental towards ascertaining the truth about facts. In this light, the importance of 
D’s personal testimony is significantly reduced because the information provided by D lacks 
the objective strength to determine the outcome of the fact-finding process, if uncorroborated 
by objectively ascertainable data. I should therefore think that it may be of use in an 
 
27 See R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime above n. 23. 
28 For a concise overview, see Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2010), p. 145. 
29 I take it that the altera pars audiatur principle may be mostly satisfied by proper representation. 
22 
 
extremely limited range of cases, which makes it possible to compensate with alternative 
institutional arrangements.  
Things are a little more complicated when we consider the justificatory function. The 
trial does not justify the criminalisation of a certain act itself; this is the task of the 
legislature. It also does not justify the possibility of D being held accountable. This has 
already been justified to D during his lifetime and while D was a participant in the political 
community, the institutional structure of which D is held to have accepted (on the caveat that 
it largely treated participants as free and equal agents). What ought to be justified to D 
directly is the application of the pre-existing norm and the imposition of a penalty or some 
other accountability-seeking measure. A state that fails to do so also fails to treat D as a free 
and equal participant in the political community. 
This, however, cannot be an absolute right. It must be seen within a wider scheme of 
the ways in which the trial is a manifestation of the way in which citizens must be treated by 
the state as citizens. The trial is also meant to protect D against unwarranted, not properly 
public accountability-seeking practices and punitive measures. It is therefore not only meant 
to give reasons to D as to why he is being punished but also to give reasons to the political 
community for not punishing D. Seen in this light, the state is not only at liberty to start 
proceedings against a dead alleged offender but also under a duty to do so. As the case of 
Jimmy Savile illustrates, the repercussions of allegations of crimes for the personhood of the 
dead can be very grave. Civil society tends to take measures which are essentially punitive 
(though not administered by the state) but not preceded by a proper ascertainment of guilt. 
Even state agencies are on occasion tempted to pre-judge the guilt and responsibility of the 
dead, especially when the dead’s alleged acts are connected to the wrongful acts of others. 
At the same time, the public institution of the trial is also in the interest of the 
political community as a whole. Once a suspicion has been raised (and especially if this has 
happened as publically as it did in Savile’s case) that a crime has been committed, there is 
good reason for the state to try to restore stability and reassure the community. Stability and 
assurance, however, can only be achieved when pursued institutionally by public bodies 
operating as representatives of the political community. Therefore on balance, holding D 
publically accountable is to treat him as well as the rest of the citizens, i.e., as free and equal 
participants in the political community.
30
 
 
30 This is in fact corroborated by many current institutional practices in various jurisdictions. Lack of space does 
not allow me to discuss such examples here. 
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